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ABSTRACT 
The paper seeks to provide an overview of memory politics in Namibia. Most of the German media 
and political debates addressing the genocide committed against the Herero, Nama, Damara, and 
San by the German Schutztruppen during the 1904-1908 counterinsurgency in the former German 
South West Africa are focused on possible legal implications. Consequences of ‘our’ ways of 
dealing with the past for ‘their’ domestic relations and memory cultural struggles in Namibia tend 
to be overlooked. Our paper intends to foster a more thorough understanding of foreign policy 
decisions’ implications for the target societies’ struggle for recognition. To that end, we first outline 
key actors in the Namibian memory politics and present contested historical narratives that can be 
found in the different actor groups. In a second step practices surrounding three physical memory 
sites in the Namibian mnemoscape are analysed, and memorialisation through commemoration is 
discussed. Finally, the paper draws attention to the necessity of including as well hitherto 
marginalized societal actors as controversial topics in memory culture debates to create an arena 
for productive contestation. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper seeks to provide some insights into Namibian politics of memory around the genocide 
committed against the Herero and Nama, Damara, and San by the German Schutztruppen during 
the 1904-1908 counterinsurgency in the former German South West Africa (1884-1915)1 (GSWA). 
Memory politics in Namibia is, on the one hand, part of the “entangled history between Namibia 
and Germany” (Kössler 2012: 278) which comprises a diversity of trajectories. On the other, it is 
also situated in the larger post-colonial debate and reconciliation politics that transcend the 
particular historical events by connecting them to global lessons (to be) drawn from mass 
atrocities, such as the need for an “integrated memory” (Ben Aharon 2020) to overcome singling 
out or even hierarchizing victim groups. The question of genocide recognition and what it implies 
– morally, legally, in terms of reparations and current political relations between successor states of 
perpetrators and of victims – includes various strands of state as well as non-state actors with 
differential claims and conflicting interests. Our paper aims to help disentangle this complex web 
and further an understanding of the necessity of including the diversity of actors below state-level 
in negotiations of the past. As collective memories are constantly reconstructed and always 
interwoven with political competition (Halbwachs 1992), the selective support or else neglect of 
some victim groups and their narratives is a powerful momentum. Post-colonial and post-conflict 
societies are especially prone to cultivate diverging memories and hence to reproduce friction 
rather than develop a connecting memory culture (see Björkdahl et al. 2017). To counteract the 
divisive potential inherent in these frictions, we appeal to decision makers to foster societal 
processes, which contest the past from a perspective in which everyone has an equal voice, and to 
work against silencing of public controversies relating to past violence – on either side in 
international relations. 
In the first section of this paper we outline the key actors in the Namibian memory politics, 
specifically Namibia’s ruling party, the South West-Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), two 
factions within the Herero speaking community, Nama organisations, and the German speaking 
community. This section will introduce contested historical narratives that can be found in the 
different actor groups, though, naturally, none of these groups are homogenous entities. The 
second section introduces three physical memory sites (the Rider Statue, the Independence 
Memorial Museum, and Swakopmund Memorial Cemetery Park) and analyses how the different 
actor groups interact with these important places (and objects) in the Namibian mnemoscape. It is 
                                                 
1  German colonial rule ended in 1915 and, in 1920, the League of Nations mandated what was now South West Africa 
(SWA) to South Africa. South Africa enforced its laws in SWA, including laws around race and the apartheid system 
from 1948 onward.  
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necessary to turn attention to the practices surrounding these concrete sites to understand the 
different histories they represent for different actor groups. Having looked at actors and examples 
of how they relate to the physical memory landscape, section three will discuss memorialisation 
through commemoration, specifically discussing Herero Day in Okahandja and its political 
significance. Section four will discuss the first repatriation of human remains (i.e., in particular 
skulls) of genocide victims from Germany in 2011, highlighting some aspects of the debate at the 
time, around what to do with the skulls once they are in Namibia, and what implications these 
decisions might have. As genocide remembrance is closely interwoven with specific sites and 
spatial order, section five addresses the expropriation of land under German colonial rule and 
focusses on debates around land reform in Namibia.  
We have chosen these foci in order to give a more differentiated overview of memory politics in 
Namibia. While most of the German media and political debate surrounding questions of how to 
recognise and compensate for the past atrocities are focused on possible legal implications – also 
beyond the specific case of Namibia – the consequences of ‘our’ ways of dealing with the past for 
‘their’ relations and memory culture struggles in Namibia tend to be overlooked. Our paper hence 
intends to foster a more thorough understanding of foreign policy decisions’ implications for the 
target societies’ struggle for recognition.  
1. NATIONAL HISTORY AND CONTESTED NARRATIVES 
1.1. The South West Africa People’s Organisation SWAPO 
This section will discuss the national historical narrative in Namibia and its significance for the 
current Namibian government, in order to gain an understanding for certain government actions 
and positions when it comes to the remembrance of the 1904-1908 genocide against the Herero 
and Nama.  
The South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) was elected as Namibia’s ruling party in 
the first national elections in 1989, with Sam Nujoma as President. SWAPO has remained the 
dominant party in Namibia since independence in 1990. From 1994 to 2020, SWAPO has kept a 
two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, giving it the authority to make unilateral 
amendments to the constitution.2 Consequently, ‘party’ and ‘state’ are often treated as if 
synonymous in the Namibian context (Zuern 2012: 496). This conflation is reflected – and also 
reproduced – by the fact that the national historical narrative, national holidays,3 memorials, and 
commemorative events are dominated by SWAPO party interests. In order to understand 
SWAPO’s position regarding the historical importance of the genocide and anti-colonial resistance 
in the early 20th century, it may be helpful to consider some key aspects of SWAPO’s narrative of 
Namibian independence. 
The SWAPO narrative of Namibian history centres around the military liberation struggle against 
South Africa (and apartheid), from 1966 to 1990 (Kössler 2012: 290; Hamrick and Duschinski 
2018: 440-1; Zuern 2012: 497).4 It lays great focus on the bravery and righteousness of SWAPO’s 
military wing, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) (Zuern 2012: 497) and glorifies 
the military struggle for independence as a ‘just war’ (Melber 2005: 102). The government adopted 
a ‘Policy of National Reconciliation’ after independence, meaning there were no official 
investigations into past crimes of the PLAN (Brock 2019: 37). This policy, in connection with the 
                                                 
2  In September 2020, SWAPO lost the 2/3 majority for the first time since 1994 (Kathindi 2020d). Kathindi (2020d) 
writes: “The President no doubt had the 2/3rds majority in mind when he appointed a National Unity Democratic 
Organisation (NUDO) President Esther Muinjangue as Health Deputy Minister”; “This comes as Ovaherero 
Paramount Chief Vekuii Rukoro earlier this year removed Muinjangue from the Ovaherero Genocide Foundation 
following her appointment as Health Deputy Minister”. 
3  See Melber 2005: 99. 
4  The insurgence was conducted mainly from Angola (Nebe 2020; also see Kössler 2007: 372).  
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glorifying narrative of SWAPO liberation, left no space for discussions on human rights violations 
committed by SWAPO during the liberation struggle, nor for mourning the ensuing losses (Zuern 
2012: 497; Melber 2005: 102).5  
SWAPO’s legitimacy springs from its narrative of Namibian independence and its own pivotal role 
in it, as the left-wing liberator of the Namibian people (Melber 2005: 103), and with lasting effect: it 
seems that most Namibians who vote for SWAPO do so not because of “its ability to offer services 
or address poverty or inequality,” but as the country’s “liberator from settler colonialism” (Zuern 
2012: 510). As SWAPO’s legitimacy and voter base are secured through the liberator narrative, it is 
important for SWAPO to control and keep up this narrative. However, this narrative leaves little 
room for non-military, non-SWAPO struggles in the 1970s and 1980s Namibia (Kössler 2007: 
372),6 nor does it include the early 20th century resistance to colonialism and the sacrifices of the 
Herero and Nama (as well as Damara or San) populations (Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 444). 
While the fight for independence is described as a ‘national movement’, it is associated only with 
the SWAPO-led military struggle. “[SWAPO] is equated with liberation, and support for 
[SWAPO] with patriotism” (Zuern 2012: 497). Further, Namibia’s foreign relations depend on this 
narrative to a certain degree. Although SWAPO implemented neo-liberal, free-market policy 
reforms post-independence, it relies on its historic ties with communism to “maintain 
international solidarities with former Soviet allies” (Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 440-1).7 
The memory landscape in Windhoek is not unaffected by these selective commemoration 
practices. While still dominated by colonial monuments and buildings, the urban landscape was 
transformed to reflect SWAPO’s narrative of national history, e.g. through the destruction of 
historical markers of colonialism or apartheid and through the construction of memory sites that 
serve the purpose of celebrating the military liberation struggle. While historical markers of 
apartheid are replaced with new structures, (the destruction of) sites relating to Herero and Nama 
history show a “conspicuous lack of state commemoration” (Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 439). 
By changing the physical memoryscape, Namibian history is focussed “on a small and specific 
people who … embody the aims and aspirations of the incipient nation-state, and [seek] to transfer 
this abstract thought into a physical embellishment of the landscape” (Gewald 2009: 270, quoted 
from Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 439). 
One way in which SWAPO controls the national narrative, is through its “One Namibia, One 
Nation” slogan.8 The slogan rhetorically unifies different ethnic communities in Namibia 
(Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 440) while warning of tribalism (Kössler 2011: 81). By framing 
historical events as ‘national’ movements, achievements, losses etc., criticisms of being 
                                                 
5  Government representatives warn against delving into the past, arguing that “if investigations are to be opened, they 
must not simply look at [SWAPO]’s actions” (Zuern 2012: 499). Similar arguments have been used by German-
speaking Namibians in reference to German crimes in former GSWA. 
6  The narrative ignores “a whole array of unarmed, as it were civil, dimensions of the liberation struggle, such as the 
workers’ and trades union movement, student activism, the role of churches and activities of traditional communities 
and their leaders is obscured by this vision” (Kössler 2007: 372). 
7  Background: during the apartheid liberation struggle, SWAPO was a left-wing militant group and received support 
from communist governments (including military support). SWAPO was also member of the Non-Aligned Movement, 
thereby gaining wider international recognition and support. SWAPO remains a member of the Socialist International. 
However, after independence, it implemented neo-liberal, free-market policy reforms to attract international 
investment (though labour unions continue to resist privatisation in some areas). These policies, following colonialism 
and apartheid, have intensified social and economic inequality in Namibia. Land reform has also been slow since 
independence; there are extreme racial disparities in landholdings (Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 440-1). SWAPO has 
failed to institute programmes to reduce broader economic inequality. Zuern (2012) notes that the Namibian 
government is cautious regarding significant economic redistribution and taxing of commercial farms (majority white-
owned) because of the German-speaking Namibian community’s ties to Germany and the Namibian government’s 
relationship with Germany (p. 506). 
8  The ‘One Namibia, One Nation’ slogan is not free from criticism in Namibia, also from within SWAPO. For instance, 
while agreeing with the sentiment and highlighting the importance of this approach, Kazenambo has criticised that the 
slogan has been used in self-interest and political convenience, rather than to unify Namibia while recognising and 
accepting its diversity (The Patriot 2019).  
5 
   
PRIF Working Paper No. 53 
underrepresented or marginalised, which are voiced by specific (ethnic) groups, are thus 
delegitimised to a certain degree. This is significant because, while the SWAPO-led “struggle for 
independence was dominated by Ovambo speakers from the northern sections of the country, who 
were spared the brunt of earlier colonial violence, […] the struggle against German rule were 
overwhelmingly fought by Herero and Nama speakers. These are living in the central and southern 
regions where the colonial forces and settlers were concentrated” (Zuern 2012: 496). 
It becomes clear that the focus on the 1970s and 1980s military struggle does not only stress 
SWAPO’s sacrifices and victories (and silences its human rights violations). It also favours 
Ovambo speakers’ contributions to Namibian national history over Herero and Nama speakers’. In 
effect, rhetorical unification glosses over the different levels of recognition and value attributed to 
certain groups. This inequality is not only expressed symbolically; while warning of tribalism, 
SWAPO mobilises its Ovambo-majority voter base through “preferential allocation of 
development aid and other resources” (Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 440).9  
However, it should be noted that party-affiliation does not run strictly along ethnic lines; there are 
Herero and Nama SWAPO members, who hold important government offices. SWAPO-affiliated 
Herero and Nama may focus on continuities, i.e. frame the apartheid liberation struggle as a 
continuation of their peoples’ 1904-1908 struggle against colonialism. This narration is apt to 
challenge both the SWAPO narrative and those who dismiss SWAPO as serving only Ovambos10 
(Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 444).  
Although counter-narratives do not usually contradict SWAPO’s national history outright,11 the 
government seldomly sends official representatives to non-SWAPO (memorial) events associated 
with alternative narrations of the past. While it does so on a few occasions,12 the attendance of 
government officials cannot necessarily be read as an acceptance of a corresponding narrative. And 
yet, the government may feel pressure to send an official representative to a memorial event for the 
1904-1908 genocide, if the German embassy or another important partner of the country makes 
such pronouncement (Zuern 2012: 510-1). 
Despite the SWAPO’s avoidance of issues and events pertaining to the Herero and Nama genocide, 
the General Assembly passed the Ovaherero Genocide Motion in 2006. This motion was brought 
forth by NUDO, an opposition party led by Paramount Chief Riruako, and called the government 
to support Herero reparations claims against Germany.13 The 2006 motion followed a 2001 class 
action lawsuit, also led by Riruako, which did not bring the desired results.14 However, the passing 
of the 2006 motion does not seem to have led to concrete action until 2015, when negotiations 
                                                 
9  The contradictions between official SWAPO positions and its politics is openly criticised. For example, in August 2020, 
the SWAPO Finance Minister, Iipumbu Shiimi, accused newly forming political parties of being tribalist. Henny 
Seibeb, deputy leader of the Landless People’s Movement, responded: “SWAPO is the biggest ethnic conglomeration in 
Namibia. It has always thrived on ethnic politics”. He noted that the positions of Vice President, Prime Minister and 
Deputy PM all belong to the same tribe, as does most of the cabinet. Seibeb also criticised SWAPO’s selective and 
biased commemoration practices (Kathindi 2020b). 
10  For continuity in the SWAPO narrative see Melber 2005: 96-7, and for contradictions with official telling, see Melber 
2005: 104. 
11  Direct contradiction of historical narratives is rare in Namibia. However, there are significant segments of the German-
speaking community who deny the genocide of 1904-1908 outright (Kössler 2007: 362). 
12  The centennial of the Battle of Ohamakari, the inauguration of Swakopmund Memorial Park, and on occasions of the 
repatriation of human remains (Zuern 2012: 510). 
13  The motion sought for Germany to officially acknowledge its crimes against the Hereros, Namas, and Damaras as 
genocide and to apologise. Germany was also to enter negotiations with representatives of the affected communities 
and the Namibian government, regarding reparations for said crimes (Brock 2019: 62). 
14  In 2001, Riruako’s Chief Hosea Kutako Foundation brought a lawsuit (in the US through the Alien Tort Claims Act of 
1789) against Germany and three German companies, which had been involved in the genocide of 1904-1908 (Hamrick 
and Duschinski 2018: 443). Backdrop: 1995 Kohl and 1998 Herzog refused to formally meet with Herero delegations when 
in Namibia (Kössler 2012: 296), and former German ambassador to Namibia, Wolfgang Massing, even urged the Herero 
people to drop the case (Shigwedha 2016: 206). During WWII similar cases had been brought up against Germany (also 
under the Alien Torts Claims Act), and settlement was reached in 1999 (Kössler 2012: 296-7). 
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between the Namibian and German governments began. Dr. Zedekia Ngavirue (Herero) was 
appointed as the Namibian Special Envoy on Genocide to lead negotiations with German Special 
Envoy, Mr. Ruprecht Polenz. A cabinet committee was established to oversee negotiations, and 
which founded a Technical Committee (in charge of research and documentation) and later the 
Chief’s Forum. It is important to mention these bodies, because the Technical Committee and the 
Chief’s Forum are the two main organs through which victim groups can take part in negotiations 
between the Namibian and German governments (Brock 2019: 62-64). Especially this aspect is a 
contentious issue regarding the involvement of Herero and Nama groups in the reparations 
negotiations. While chiefs and interested parties are encouraged to participate through these 
channels, the government has been criticised for limiting the involvement of (certain) traditional 
leaders. This will be discussed in more detail in the following parts, which will expound on 
different interest groups within the Herero and Nama communities and their involvement, or lack 
thereof, in the negotiations with Germany.  
1.2. Actor Constellations in Herero and Nama Communities 
This subsection discusses actors and groups within the affected communities,15 including 
contentions between two main Herero factions, the Maharero Group and the Riruako Group.16 
However, although they are contending groups, they appear to have very similar aims: activists 
emphasise the continuous suffering in their communities, underlining that the effects of the 
genocide are still felt today. They call for “efficient and effective land reform processes that 
acknowledge pre-colonial land claims, financial compensation for stolen cattle and other losses, 
access to mental and physical health services, repatriation of all human remains and cultural 
artefacts still in Germany to Namibia following culturally appropriate protocols, development aid 
in areas populated by affected communities, and apologies and other forms of symbolic 
acknowledgment, including monuments, memorials, and museums” (Hamrick and Duschinski 
2018: 443). 
The two Herero groups mentioned above are divided – it seems primarily – by their positions on 
Paramount Chieftancy, though Hamrick and Duschinski (2018) find that this divide can also be 
observed in their support for different political parties and genocide committees or organisations. 
The groups also differ in their historical narratives and legal imaginations. The first group does not 
recognise the Paramount Chief and supports the SWAPO-recognised Royal Traditional 
Authorities (Maharero Group),17 while the second does support the Paramount Chief, currently 
Vekuii Rikoro (Riruako Group).18 This distinction between those who support the Paramount 
Chief and those who support the Maharero Royal House is also referenced in other works,19 as well 
as in newspaper articles20 (Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 445). 
While the Maharero Group is affiliated with SWAPO, those in the Riruako Group tend to support 
oppositional parties. This is also tied to differing historical narratives prevalent in each group: the 
Maharero Group sees both the genocide and the apartheid liberation struggle as part of the same 
process of anti-colonial resistance and fight for justice, while the Riruako Group looks to the 
                                                 
15  When referring to the ‘affected communities’, this paper means those communities whose forebears were victims of 
genocide. 
16   Term as used in Hamrick (2013) and Hamrick and Duschinski (2018). 
17  Hamrick calls this group the ‘Maharero Group’. For all of Namibia there are 52 recognised Royal Traditional 
Authorities. The Herero have multiple chiefs, subchiefs and royal houses, including the (most well-known) Maharero 
Royal House (Red Flag), led by Tjinani Maharero since 2012. Hamrick and Duschinski (2018) argue that the 
government recognises Royal House leaders and chiefs based on their affiliation to SWAPO. Consequently, the 
position of Paramount Chief, held at the time by Riruako (opposition), was never recognised by the SWAPO-led 
government (Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 445). 
18  Hamrick calls this group the ‘Riruako Group’, because Kuaimi Riruako was Paramount Chief at the time of her field 
research. Riruako held this position from 1978 until his death in 2014, followed by Fanuel Tjombe, who died weeks 
after taking the position. Rikoro followed him in 2014. The position of Paramount Chief is contested, as it does not 
legally exist in independent Namibia (Kahiurika 2016).  
19  Van Beek, Gewald and Kaapama (2017) wrote an article on tensions around the Red Flag Day commemorations in 
Okahandja, which were cancelled for the first time in 2012 due to tensions (and fear of violence) between these two factions 
(see also Hamrick 2013: 34-57). 
20  E.g. The Patriot 2019. 
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genocide as the primary defining historical event. While the Maharero Group may also criticise 
SWAPO for Ovambo favouritism, the Riruako Group is more deeply sceptical of state law, seeing it 
as fundamentally biased. These positions influence the approaches of the two majority-Herero 
genocide committees. The Ovaherero/Ovambanderu Council for Dialogue (ONCD-04)21 enjoys 
the support of the Maharero Group and seeks to achieve its reparations goals through dialogue 
with, and support of, SWAPO. The Riruako Group supports the Ovaherero Genocide Council 
(OGC), which is more confrontational and critical of SWAPO (Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 
445-6). The two committees have worked together in the past, though “such projects have been 
marked by significant tensions, and past attempts to merge into one committee have been short-
lived” (ibid.: 446). 
The Nama Genocide Technical Committee (NGTC) is the last of the three main genocide 
committees. While it avoids positioning itself in Herero politics, it works more closely with the 
OGC than the ONCD-04 (Hamrick and Duschinksi 2018: 442). It has also worked together with 
the Nama Traditional Leaders Association (NTLA), through which traditional leaders of the 
various Nama groups and clans are represented.22 Shigwedha (2016) finds differences in Herero 
and Nama traditional leaders’ relationships to the SWAPO-led government. He argues that Herero 
leaders are more critical and want the government to take a more forceful approach in negotiations 
with Germany, while Nama leaders take a more pro-government stance, and seek to avoid 
disruptions of Namibian-German relations (p. 209). However, these observations are not reflected 
in the relationships between the genocide committees.23 
While the ONCD-04 has been represented in negotiations with Germany (within the given 
framework), the OGC and NGTC are not. Many activists have called for a trialogue between 
Germany, the Namibian government, and the affected communities, but the Namibian 
government has made it clear that the current framework would remain in place and both the 
German and Namibian governments agreed in that they will remain the leading negotiating parties 
(Brock 2019: 65). While both the Namibian and the German governments emphasise that affected 
community leaders are involved and welcome (Brock 2019: 67), how open this process truly is, is 
most heavily contested.24 The Namibian government has repeatedly been criticised for not 
involving (the more SWAPO critical) members of the affected communities.25  
In August 2020, an English-language weekly newspaper, the Windhoek Observer, published an 
article, stating that 70% of affected community members do not feel represented in the 
negotiations, nor are they vested in the results: “As far as they are concerned, the process for 
reparations has not started yet. Affected communities have stated that whatever is decided by the 
two governments regarding the genocide, has no impact on their demands for restorative justice 
from Germany” (Observer 2020). Instead, these community members are vested more heavily in a 
court case filed in 2017.  
In 2017 Paramount Chief Rikoro and Kaptein Johannes Isaack filed a joint lawsuit against 
Germany and three German corporations.26 While the case has been dismissed after appeal (as of 
September 2020), traditional leaders plan to file for a rehearing and for ‘En Banc’ proceedings 
(Kathindi 2020). Traditional leaders contend that “no viable and lasting negotiated settlement is 
possible without the full, direct and active participation of the Ovaherero and Nama Leaders 
representing the overwhelming majority of the Victim Communities – as opposed to handpicked 
pro-Government clan Chiefs” (Kathindi 2020). 
In the same vein, the government’s ‘One Namibia, One Nation’ approach also contributes to 
dissatisfaction with the negotiations in the affected communities. The government avoids naming 
the Herero and Nama as victims of genocide, speaking rather of ‘Namibian victims’. Activists have 
read this as an attempt by the government to control the historical narrative: “They want to 
sidestep the historical reality of the targeted groups of people who were the […] victims of 
genocide. Government wishes to keep the victims vague to keep the beneficiaries of the reparations 
                                                 
21  Now ONCD-04, as some Nama chiefs have joined (Brock 2019: 64). 
22  Information on Nama organisations (and contestations) is less available than information on Herero groups.  
23  Interestingly, similar observations have not been made by other authors. 
24  Hamrick and Duschinski find that most activists call for a trialogue (2018: 443), as well as for comprehensive 
compensation, support, and symbolic acknowledgement (ibid.). 
25  E.g. Zimmerer 2019. 
26  Representing the Ovaherero Traditional Authority (OTA) and the Nama Traditional Leaders Association (NTLA). 
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vague” (Observer 2020). They also criticise that the Herero, Nama, and San in diaspora are not 
represented at all in the negotiations (ibid.). 
Bernard Swartbooi, leader of the (not ethnically bound) Landless People’s Movement (formed 
2018), made a statement in August 2020, calling the affected communities to “organise themselves 
on a higher level, set up joint technical negotiation team, to start putting figures together”, rather 
than simply demanding to be involved in the government negotiations (Kathindi 2020). He also 
argued that the government does not have the power of attorney to negotiate on behalf of the 
affected communities, as it has never received an official invitation to do so (Kathindi 2020c). 
It should be mentioned that there are Herero SWAPO members who are critical of the 
negotiations and the lack of involvement of the affected communities. The interest groups outlined 
above do not run along strict lines. For example, Kazenambo Kazenambo is a well-known Herero 
SWAPO member and former politician,27 who has been vocal on the negotiations between the 
Namibian and German governments. Early on, Kazenambo criticised the lack of involvement of 
affected communities, warning of potential dangers of their exclusion, and has voiced support for 
the 2017 court case in New York (The Patriot 2018).  
To conclude this short overview of the main actor groups within the affected communities: the 
Herero community is roughly divided into two factions; the Maharero Group and the Riruako 
Group. There is less information on different Nama associations, though the NGTC works more 
closely with the government-critical OGC. There is very little to no information on Damara or San 
groups.28 
1.3. German-speaking Namibians 
The last group that will be looked at in this paper are German-speaking Namibians. As is the case 
with any group, the German-speaking community is, of course, not homogenous and there are 
differing opinions and positions within it when it comes to the colonial legacy and the genocide of 
1904-1908 (Zuern 2012: 506). However, “a routinised argument denying the colonial genocide is 
still prominent, if not prevalent, amongst this group” (Kössler 2007: 377). 
This denial is reflected in the only German-speaking newspaper Allgemeine Zeitung and the radio 
station, the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC)29 (Kössler 2007: 377-8). There is a “whole 
discursive bent and strategy, grasping at every straw to ‘relativise, belittle or embellish’” (ibid.: 
378). These alternative narratives of German colonialism and the genocide are made material in 
multiple privately financed museums (ibid.). It becomes clear that the German-speaking 
community disposes over resources, in terms of material wealth, expertise, and communicative 
structures, which allow it to consolidate and materialise its trivialising narrative of German crimes 
(ibid.).30  
Not only are German crimes belittled or denied, the former colonial power began to celebrate the 
genocide as the ‘victorious Battle of the Waterberg’ shortly after it had taken place. The annual 
commemoration for the fallen German soldiers even continued until 2003, when it was banned by 
then-President Nujoma – 13 years after independence (Kössler 2012: 284). Regarding calls for 
acknowledgement of German crimes and reparations, one common position is, “if one wishes to 
consider actions of the German colonial authorities, then one must also interrogate the violent acts 
indigenous groups committed against one another both during and prior to colonial rule, 
                                                 
27  Former Minister of Youth, National Service, Sport and Culture (2010-2012) and former Deputy Minister of Local and 
Regional Government, Housing and Rural Development (2005-2010). 
28  Kössler (2012) mentions the Damara Cultural Heritage Forum, which was formed in 2005. They raise awareness to the 
17,000 Damara who disappeared 1903-08 and criticise the marginal role given to the Damara in the national narrative (p. 
301). Kössler does not elaborate on the group’s (potential) positions on national recognition or commemoration of the 
early 20th century anti-colonial resistance and genocide. 
29  Funded partially by private donations and the support of successive German governments. “Such activities – including 
pronouncements on the Holocaust (that would be illegal in Germany) have been met with remarkable tolerance by the 
Namibian government” (Kössler 2007: 378). Kössler (2010) gives interesting insights into the German-speaking 
community in Namibia, specifically looking at historical developments between German colonial rule and independence 
(regarding Nazism and Apartheid) and collective identity.  
30  German speakers held central privileged positions during settler colonialism and continued to do so under South African 
rule. Even today, the minority “remain[s] an economically powerful and conspicuous grouping in independent Namibia” 
(Kössler 2012: 293). This enduring disparity is a reminder of the sufferings and losses endured during German colonisation 
and the genocide (ibid.: 292).  
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suggesting that if one cannot investigate all abuses, one has no right to investigate any” (Zuern 
2012: 499). 
German-speaking Namibians are not actively involved in the national discourse on genocide 
issues. The Namibian ambassador to Germany, Peter Katjavivi, emphasised that the inclusion of 
this community would be an important step in reconciliatory processes (Brock 2019: 55). 
However, while “most German speakers remain outside of formal politics and keep largely to 
themselves, a vocal segment of the German-speaking community accords great importance to its 
monuments and will go to significant lengths to protect them” (Zuern 2012: 506). The removal of 
the Rider Statue (Reiterdenkmal) was particularly controversial. The next section will take a closer 
look at this and other significant aspects of Namibia’s – and here especially Windhoek’s – physical 
memory landscape.  
2. PHYSICAL MEMORY LANDSCAPE 
Apart from the Independence Memorial Museum and its surroundings, “[…] Windhoek[’s] 
memory landscape remains characterised by German colonial buildings and monuments that 
reference the Namibian War and underscore the colonial perspective of these events” (Kössler 
2015: 31). While there have been informal re-appropriations of these colonial monuments, their 
“main content and overall import” have not changed (ibid.). This section will look at a selection of 
monuments and other memory sites, which have been surrounded by activism and continued 
controversy.  
2.1. The Rider Statue (Reiterdenkmal) 
The Rider Statue was erected in 1912, as a symbol of imperial power and Germany’s perpetual 
claim to sovereignty, specifically honouring the German soldiers and civilians who died during the 
1904-1908 colonial war (Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 447). The Rider Statue depicts a 
Schutztruppe soldier mounted on his horse, standing high on a platform with his weapon raised. It 
was erected to the left of the Alte Feste (1890)31 and across the road from the Christuskirche 
(1910),32 the latter of which also makes explicit reference to these events (Kössler 2007: 373). 
There have been several activist initiatives surrounding the Rider Statue, from various 
communities.33 For example, in 1994 two German speakers led the ‘Reiterdenkmal Initiative’, 
which sought to add a plaque to the statue, “to honour ‘all victims of military conflict since the 
colonisation of the country, as a gesture towards the newly achieved liberty that embraced all 
citizens of the country’” (Melber 2005: 110, quoted from Zuern 2012: 507). While this initiative 
does not seem very controversial, it was turned down by the National Museum’s Council34 ten 
years later, in 2004 (Melber 2005: 110). The initiative’s reception within the German speaking 
community was mixed; “[a] small number of German speakers strongly opposed the addition of 
the plaque, while others challenged the wording […] On the other hand, there is still active denial 
among a significant number of German speakers that genocide occurred” (Zuern 2012: 507).  
When it became clear that there were plans to move or remove the Rider memorial, public debates 
ensued (especially around 2008 and 2012/13). For parts of the German speaking community, who 
value their colonial heritage, the Rider Statue serves as a source of pride and identity (Hamrick and 
Duschinski 2018: 449). When plans to build the Independence Memorial Museum in place of the 
monument became known, “the Rider became a veritable rallying point of identity statements by 
relevant groups of German speakers” (Kössler 2015: 153). The image of German colonialism 
depicted in Namibia’s German language newspaper, Allgemeine Zeitung, “thrives on the 
projections about civilising pioneers and their achievements” (Kössler 2015: 153). This focus on 
                                                 
31  This was “the main military stronghold of the colonial power in Windhoek” (Kössler 2015: 29). 
32  Civilising narrative; the Lutheran church stands in part on the site of the historical Orumbo rua Katjombondi 
concentration camp (Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 438; Kössler 2015: 27). Prisoners from the camps were used to 
construct the church (Kössler 2012: 286). 
33  This activism was not limited to genocide issues. To protest forcible relocation into segregated township in 1959, Herero 
activists anonymously covered the Rider’s head with a sack and decorated the statue with flowers (Hamrick and 
Duschinski 2018: 447). 
34  That no broader controversy followed may be due to lacking resources. Kössler (2007) writes: “to attain a voice – in this 
case a moderately critical one, aimed at genuine reconciliation – is predicated on access to sufficient means: money and 
organizational skills, connections and available free time” (p. 374). 
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the alleged “achievements” of German colonisation erase colonial crimes and resulting (current) 
inequalities from the narrative (ibid.).35 After the move (2010), the German Cultural Council 
(Deutscher Kulturrat) held a rededication ceremony and an event for the 100th anniversary of the 
Rider, where “aggressive speeches and actions” were held (Kössler 2015: 158-9).  
However, moving the Rider Statue did not only meet resistance in the German speaking community. 
Zuern (2012) notes that, for most in the affected communities, the Rider “is no longer a symbol of 
colonial might, but offers a site for demands for reparations and who has the right to white-owned 
land” (p. 510). Kössler (2015) found that, for many Ovaherero, the original location of the Rider 
Statue primarily marked the site of the of Orumbo rua Katjombondi concentration camp, serving as a 
reminder of the suffering of their community (p. 31). In 2008, to protest the feared erasure of colonial 
crimes, activists set up 51 wooden crosses around the statue to draw attention to the indigenous 
deaths that were not recognised on the plaque (Zuern 2012: 507). In the same year, a number of well-
known Herero public figures spoke out against the removal of the statue, including Kazenambo 
Kazenambo, Katuutire Kaura,36 and Paramount Chief Riruako (leader of NUDO at the time).37 They 
argued that the Rider Statue has also gained symbolic value for the communities who fought against 
colonialism and suffered genocide (ibid.). It is important to consider that the Rider Statue is one of 
the few historical sites, which directly references the genocide.  
The Rider was relocated by around 150 meters in 2009, to make space for the construction of the 
Independence Memorial Museum (Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 447). The statue was 
disassembled and stored for multiple months before it was reassembled. This whole process was 
financed by private donations from the German-speaking community, demonstrating how “the 
economic power of a rather small but disproportionately privileged group enables them to project 
quite vigorously their particular vision of the past, which to a considerable extent revolves around 
the denial of the genocide” (Kössler 2012: 286; see also Zuern 2012: 507). 
In 2012 the statue’s removal was discussed again, to which (among others) reparations activists 
objected, arguing that the Rider Statue was the only historical marker on the former grounds of the 
Orumbo rue Katjombondi concentration camp, and in Windhoek’s memory landscape as a whole, 
which makes specific reference to the genocide of the Herero and Nama (Hamrick and Duschinski 
2018: 449-50). In December 2013, the memorial was removed, without prior announcement 
(Kössler 2015: 160). Today the Rider stands, without his pedestal, in the courtyard of the Alte Feste, 
as a “historical object” (Tjihenuna 2014; Kössler 2015: 148). The original site of the Rider Statue is 
now occupied by a towering statue of Sam Nujoma holding the constitution, while the Rider’s 
second position is taken by a Genocide Memorial (Kössler 2015: 168).  
The debate around the removal of the Rider Statue is particularly interesting because it was so 
controversial, not only for German speaking Namibians, but also for the affected communities. 
Across the different communities similar sentiments were voiced concerning the importance of 
physical sites of remembrance (though, of course, the historical narratives differ dramatically 
between the discussed groups). The Rider Statue also offered a site for activism (be it for opposing 
interest groups). 
2.2. The National Independence Memorial Museum 
As it is so entwined with the removal of the Rider Statue and because there were some public 
debates around the role the museum should play in Namibia’s and Windhoek’s memory 
landscape, this section will give a short impression of the National Independence Memorial 
Museum. 
The focus of the Memorial Museum and the site on which it stands were subject of debate prior to 
the inauguration. In 2011, then-president of South West Africa National Union (SWANU), 
Usutuaije Maamberua, addressed parliament with a motion to rename the planned Independence 
Memorial Museum to Genocide Remembrance Centre. He argued that an independence museum 
would be redundant, considering the many references to the 1970s-1980s independence struggle 
already present in Windhoek (Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 438; Hamrick 2013: 59). Maamberua 
                                                 
35  However, “such deeply colonial modes of thinking are proving unsustainable. The relocation of the Rider therefore 
appeared as tangible proof of a change in power relations, at least as far as symbolic politics go” (Kössler 2015: 153). 
36  Leader of the DTA. 
37  All three were central participants in the Red Flag Day celebrations and support calls for reparations (Zuern 2012: 507). 
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withdrew his motion upon reassurance that one floor of the museum would be entirely devoted to 
the Herero and Nama genocide, that the horrors of the Orumbo rua Katjombondi concentration 
camp would be made visible, and that funds for smaller remembrance centres would be secured in 
the 2012-2013 budget. However, when the budget was released, such allocations were not made 
(Hamrick 2013: 60). Maamberua confronted Kazenambo Kazenambo, in his position as then-
Minister of Youth, Sport and Culture on the floor of parliament, but this did not bring about the 
desired changes (ibid.). 
The Museum was inaugurated in 2014, on Namibian Independence Day, by then-president 
Pohamba. It also stands on the former grounds of the concentration camp, breaking up the cluster of 
colonial monuments there, together with the replacement of the Schutztruppe Rider with Sam 
Nujoma (Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 450-1). In his inauguration speech, President Pohamba kept 
to the ‘One Namibia, One Nation’ narrative, although he recognised the crimes committed against 
the Herero and Nama on the site. While the museum focusses on the SWAPO-led military liberation 
struggle, it contains a ‘Chamber of Horrors’ dedicated to the colonial genocide (ibid.: 438).  
The inauguration in 2014 also included the unveiling of the genocide memorial, which replaced 
the Rider in his second position. A large bas-relief mural depicts the hanging of three Herero or 
Nama genocide victims. This makes a kind of plinth, on which a victorious bronze statue of a man 
and a woman with raised fists, revealing broken chains, stands. The words ‘Their Blood Waters our 
Freedom’ are raised between these two ‘parts’ of the monument (Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 
451).  
Activists connected with the ONCD-04 celebrated these references to the genocide, as part of the 
national narrative of Namibian history, as a victory. Activists connected with the OGC and the 
NGTC were more critical, noting the lack of involvement of the Herero and Nama communities in 
the conceptualisation of the museum. The Riruako Group first threatened to boycott the unveiling, 
but then attended and even “expressed pride in the memorial but also reminded reporters that his 
group, the OGC, had struggled for years to make the monument possible” (Hamrick and 
Duschinski 2018: 451).38  
2.3. The Swakopmund Memorial Cemetery Park (2005) 
Having discussed the Rider Statue as a colonial monument and the Memorial Museum as a 
national project, this subsection will give an impression of one citizen-led initiative concerned with 
the Namibian memory landscape. While there have been various citizen-led initiatives,39 this 
subsection is concerned with the Swakopmund Memorial Cemetery Park because it represents the 
dividing lines that run through Namibian society in a remarkable way.  
The Swakopmund Cemetery “has long been an abrupt visual reminder of colonialism and 
apartheid” (Zuern 2012: 507-508). The graves of white Christians and South African soldiers could 
be found on the well-tended original grounds of the cemetery, Jewish graves were located outside 
of the original grounds (though they had headstones), and the African cemetery was unmarked in 
the open desert. The African cemetery comprises graves of those killed during the colonial time 
and the 1904-1908 genocide, including many who died in labour camps. These graves were often 
reused, driven, ridden, or walked over by passers-by, and the grounds were partially used for 
construction. Two residents initiated a project to build a wall around the cemetery, protecting the 
unmarked graves and creating a single unified cemetery. (Zuern 2012: 507-10) The project was 
widely viewed as a reconciliatory move. It was supported by the SWAPO-dominated municipality, 
which called for local residents and artists to participate in the conceptualisation,40 and “endorsed 
by the Herero-speaking community which has since held traditional ceremonies at the site, funded 
in part by the German embassy” (Zuern 2012: 510).  
In 2007, the Herero community inaugurated a monument dedicated to the victims of the German 
concentration camps at the Swakopmund Memorial Cemetery (on the African side of the unified 
                                                 
38  The OGC’s subcommittee on monuments and memorials often has difficulty getting state approval or funding. Some 
members have expressed frustration at this and suspect the process is politicised – that it is made more difficult for 
oppositional party members or supporters to gain access to funds (Hamrick and Duschinski 2018: 446). 
39  For example the memorial to Captain Fredericks on Shark Island, the site of the country’s most infamous concentration 
camp. 
40  It included the involvement of German speakers as well. 
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cemetery). The monument draws attention to the thousands of Ovaherero/Ovambanderu who 
died in the concentration camps in Swakopmund between 1904 and 1908. However, the creators of 
the memorial sought for it to be reconciliatory, “avoid[ing] a direct accusation against German 
forces by stating that those who died did so ‘under mysterious circumstances’” (Zuern 2012: 508). 
The occasion of the inauguration was used to draw attention to the issue of reparations from 
Germany. Residents of Swakopmund and Herero speakers from other communities came together 
for the All Ovaherero/Ovambanderu Reparation Walk prior to the unveiling (Zuern 2012: 508). 
3. HERERO DAY IN OKAHANDJA 
Having discussed selected places of memory and how these places are used, this section will turn 
toward the oldest and most well-known annual communal commemoration in central and 
southern Namibia: Herero Day in Okahandja (Kössler 2015: 183). Specifically, this section will 
highlight some important political dimensions of the event. 
Herero Day originated as the commemoration of the reburial of Paramount Chief Samuel 
Maharero, who died in exile and was reburied in Okahandja in 1923. His reburial was important 
because: 1) this symbolic event recentred dispersed Herero groups, “to constitute them as a 
‘nation’”; 2) it increased the prevalence of ‘traditional’ practices in Herero communities; and 3) the 
organisation of the event itself and its remarkable success41 strengthened existing bonds between 
groups and communities (ibid.: 184). Okahandja is also significant, because it is the traditional 
capital of the Red Band (Kössler 2012: 287-8) and where the first shots were fired in January 1904 
(Zuern 2012: 500). 
While we will not go into the details of the commemorative activities practiced on Herero Day, a 
few points relating to the politically charged nature of the event need to be discussed shortly.42 The 
commemorations take place over the course of three days, alluding to or making direct references 
to current national (memory) politics in a number of ways. Kössler (2015) points to two ways in 
which Herero Day does this. First, Herero Day often falls together with the national holiday 
Heroes’ Day, which marks the first military encounter of the liberation war in 1966 (August 26th). 
While government representatives go to great lengths to attend Heroes’ Day celebrations, Herero 
Day does not receive such national recognition (p. 189-190). In this way, the coinciding 
commemorations manifest a central conflict in Namibian national memory politics.  
The centennial commemorations of the genocide in 2004 offer an example of these dynamics. 
Herero Day marked the height of the commemorative events organised by the affected 
communities. Members of the Red, Green, and White Flags were present43 (Zuern 2012: 502). 
Between 5,000 and 10,000 Ovaherero from across southern Africa attended the event; it “was an 
important step in the reproduction and reconstitution of Herero ethnicity” (Kössler 2012: 297). 
However, no official government representative attended the 2004 Herero Day. Instead, for the 
parallel Heroes’ Day celebrations that year (38th anniversary), the government unveiled a new 
monument honouring the SWAPO-led liberation struggle, with full attendance of the cabinet 
(Kössler 2007: 363; Melber 2005: 107).  
However, the then Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation and successor to Sam 
Nujoma as president, Hifikepunye Pohamba did attend the commemoration of the Battle of 
Ohamakari at Okakarara that same year (Melber 2005: 107). It remains speculation to what extent 
Pohamba’s attendance was motivated by the attendance of two other guests that year: the then-
German Minister for Economic Cooperation, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, representing Namibia’s 
largest donor, or late King Kauluma, the most influential traditional leader in northern Namibia 
and Chairperson of the Council of Traditional Leaders (Melber 2005c: 142). Zuern (2012) argues 
that “once the German embassy agrees to send official representation to a memorial event, the 
Namibian government is pressured to do so as well” (p. 511). She adds that, “when Namibian 
government representatives then attend commemorations and speak at these events, they give 
support to the counter-narratives of liberation that the activists organising the events present” 
(ibid.).  
                                                 
41  In the form of participation of 2,000-3,000 people. 
42  For details on Herero Day in Okahandja and further communal commemoration see Kössler 2015: 183-192. 
43  Nama groups from southern Namibia were underrepresented; Kössler (2012) ascribes this to a certain amount of Herero 
exclusionism regarding victimhood (p. 297). For more on competitive victimhood see Melber 2005: 108-109. 
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In fact, the attendance of each was significant: Wiecoreck-Zeul spoke at the commemoration and 
gave an apology for German crimes, breaking with German policy at the time. As a follow-up, in 
2005, she unilaterally announced a 20 million Euro reconciliation initiative.44 King Kauluma’s 
attendance “underlined the willingness to acknowledge […] the primary resistance and its 
sacrifices” and its importance for nation-building (Melber 2005c: 142). As the most influential 
leader in what was previously known as Ovamboland (SWAPO voter base), his position on the 
matter may have been seen as important enough to send government representation to the event 
(ibid.). 
A second important aspect of Herero Day lies in the speeches that take place on the third day. 
These speeches have often been used to narrate the history of the genocide and to make calls for 
reparations. These largely make references to “the ongoing campaign, led by the late Ovaherero 
Paramount Chief Kuaima Riruako, for adequate German apology and compensation for genocide. 
As long as the Namibian government tended to shun this issue, attendance seemed ill-advised in 
their point of view” (Kössler 2015: 190).  
The emphasis on reparations during Herero Day commemorations increased in the years 
following the centennial.45 For example, the issue became underscored “in 2005 with the 
attendance of South African Attorney Jeremy Sarkin who briefed listeners on the position about 
pending lawsuits in the United States, and even more one year later, with the speech by the Left 
Party Deputy in the German Bundestag, Hüseyin Aydin” (Kössler 2015: 190). Herero Day has thus 
become a significant site for memory politics around the genocide of the Herero and Nama; 
however, the ceremonial occupation of Okahandja by the oturupa and the visiting of the chiefly 
graves remain central to the commemorations46 (Kössler 2012: 288). 
4. REPATRIATION OF HUMAN REMAINS IN 2011 
One of the main concerns articulated by activists from the affected communities has been the 
complete repatriation of human remains from Germany. After the genocide, concentration camps 
were set up in Lüderitz Bay, Okahandja, Swakopmund, and Windhoek (among others). The death 
rates in these camps were extremely high. Remains of those that died in the camps (and especially 
their skulls) were sold to scientists, museums, and universities in Germany47 (Shigwedha 2016: 
198-199). In the mid-2000s, Paramount Chief Riruako brought a motion for the repatriation of 
skulls from Germany to parliament. This motion “was coupled with demands for material and 
moral reparation payable to the descendants of the genocide victims” (Shigwedha 2016: 200). In 
2007, the Namibian government forwarded the appeal to the German government (ibid.). This 
section will not go into detail on this process. Rather, it will focus on the discourse within 
Namibian society on what to do with the human remains, once they have been repatriated. 
In 2011, a delegation of 54 people, led by the then-Minister of Youth, National Service, Sport and 
Culture, Kazenambo Kazenambo, and Herero and Nama chiefs, went to Germany to receive 
twenty skulls from the Charité University Hospital in Berlin (Zuern 2012: 512; Shidwedha 2016: 
201). The handover ceremony was marked by dissatisfaction at German diplomatic tactlessness as 
the Foreign Office only sent a state secretary to attend as guest, and she missed the opportunity of 
stating an apology (see Shidwedha 2016: 202-3; Kössler 2012: 307-308; Brock 2019: 61).48  
There was some controversy over what should happen with the skulls once they arrive in Namibia. 
Zuern (2012) notes that Herero and Nama activists envisioned a return of the remains to Shark 
Island (p. 513), while Shigwedha (2016) states that this proposal came from the Namibian cabinet, 
without consultation with the affected communities (p. 207). According to Shigwedha, this idea 
                                                 
44  When President Pohamba visited Berlin that year, his delegation refused to sign the agreement (Kössler 2012: 299). 
45  This is perhaps also in connection with Wieczorek-Zeul’s speech at the commemoration for the Battle of Ohamakari. 
46  The chiefly graves are of great importance for Herero claims to ancestral land (see Kössler 2015: 186-189). 
47  “The practice of trading human bones, particularly skulls, in German South West Africa was so widespread that a number 
of postcards were made ‘showing soldiers packing skulls – as normal colonial life’” (Shigwedha 2016: 199). 
48  There were also multiple occasions, where German government representatives (i.e. through German ambassadors to 
Namibia, Egon Kochanke and his successor, Otto Huckmann) warned against using the repatriation of human remains as 
a “catalyst to unmask atrocities committed by Imperial Germany” and against demanding reparations (Shigwedha 2016: 
204). The ambassadors used Germany’s development cooperation with Namibia to put pressure on the Namibian 
government (ibid.). In 2013, President Geingob responded: “We cannot stop people from talking about reparations. It is 
their rights to do so” (ibid.). 
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was met with criticism from representatives of the Herero communities, who “felt that the 
‘historical material evidence should never be buried’” (ibid). Ovaherero Paramount Chief Riruako 
and Nama Chief David Frederick addressed the Namibian parliament in a memorandum, 
criticising the government’s lack of involvement of the affected communities. They suggest that, 
“instead of burying such vital material evidence where no one will see them, the skulls should be 
kept in a special chamber within the Independence Memorial Museum for restoration and 
posterity; statistical data about the skulls should include the victim’s identity” (ibid.: 208). It was 
decided that the skulls would be received by the Namibian Prime Minister, “viewed at Parliament 
Gardens, memorialised at Heroes’ Acre and […] interred at the Independence Memorial Museum” 
(Zuern 2012: 513).  
The memorandum followed a meeting of ten members of the Herero Chiefs Council, who agreed 
that the bones should “become part of the property of the Namibian government so that they can 
be kept in a professional way and keep the memory of this part of Namibian history alive for future 
generations” (Shigwedha 2016: 207). This account is very different from Zuern’s earlier analysis, to 
wrote that “what was initially envisioned by Nama activists as a return of Herero and Nama heroes 
to Shark Island became a return of Namibian heroes to the key sites of state” (Zuern 2012: 513). It 
appears that the two authors assessed the controversy quite differently over whether the human 
remains should be displayed or receive a burial. However, this may be due to differing foci, i.e. on 
the traditional leaders versus on the broader affected communities. This perspective shines 
through when Shigwedha (2016) writes that “[t]he majority of the Herero population group would 
generally be happy to see the skulls of their ancestors buried at Okahandja where most leaders of 
the 1904–05 uprising against the Germans are buried” (p. 208); or else that “the majority in 
affected communities would be in distress when the human remains of their ancestors are left 
unburied” (ibid.: 212).  
The question of whether to hold a burial or to keep the skulls at the Independence Memorial 
Museum can also be tied to discussions on whether the repatriation of human remains should be 
understood as the “symbolic closure of a tragic chapter” or rather as a starting point for processes 
of restorative justice (Zuern 2012: 513). While the then-Namibian Prime Minister Nahas Angula 
framed the returning of the skulls as the former, Herero and Nama activists have criticised this 
stance (ibid.). “[I]t can be argued that the repatriation of the skulls from Germany seeks to open 
old wounds rather than heal them” (Shigwedha 2016: 211), perhaps in order to aid demands for 
apology and reparations from Germany.  
Once decided that the human remains would be kept in the Independence Memorial Museum, 
another debate arose: SWAPO leadership would have preferred “to include the skulls as one small 
and early piece of Namibia’s struggle against external oppression”, while many Herero and Nama 
activists believe that their forebears should receive a more prominent role in the narrative, arguing 
that they “began the liberation struggle” (Zuern 2012: 513). Using the occasion of the repatriation 
of human remains, activists organised events in Berlin and in Windhoek-Katutura, to which 
prominent political figures were invited. Neither German nor Namibian government officials 
attended these events, which “provided key opportunities for activists not only to reiterate the 
history of genocide but also to make demands for reparations” (ibid.). 
2014 saw the repatriation of another 35 skulls from Germany (Shigwedha 2016: 207), and this time, 
no representatives of the affected communities were present in the delegation, except the deputy 
chairman of the Council of Traditional Leaders (Brock 2019: 61). Nineteen more skulls and other 
bones were repatriated in 2018. This was the first repatriation of human remains since Germany 
officially changed its position on the recognition of the crimes of 1904-1908 as genocide in 2015. 
For the first time, a state-to-state handover was agreed upon and a delegation of German 
government representatives travelled to Windhoek to partake in a ceremony to mark the occasion. 
However, members of the OGF and NGTC were disappointed with the event, both due to the 
venue and having not given a prominent role. (Brock 2019: 75-76)49  
                                                 
49  OGF: Ovaherero Genocide Foundation; NGTC: Nama Genocide Technical Committee. A more inclusive attempt has been 
made with the 2019 symposium “Colonial Injustice – Addressing Past Wrongs”, organised in Windhoek by the European 
Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), the German Akademie der Künste (AdK) and the Goethe-Institut: 
https://www.ecchr.eu/en/event/namibia-a-week-of-justice. 
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5. LAND CLAIMS 
The last aspect we address in this paper in connection with memory politics is the discourse 
around land restitution in Namibia.50 The reason is that Herero and Nama activists emphasise the 
“loss of land as a primary consequence of the genocide affecting their communities today” 
(Hamrick 2013: 82). 
After enduring German colonisation and South African apartheid, independent Namibia was left 
with extreme and racialised land ownership disparities. Half of Namibia’s land was in the 
ownership of 3,500 white farmers while 1 million black Namibians merely had access to overgrazed 
communal lands (Hamrick 2013: 81). The new government was “required to honour a rule of law 
based on the recognition of existing property relations”, protecting landowners from expropriation 
(Melber 2005b: 137). However, this “constraint for social transformation, does […] not prevent 
options to adopt reformist land policies aimed at creating more equality” (ibid.).  
Nevertheless, land reform did not take a priority for several reasons. One is that German 
colonialism was experienced differently in northern Namibia versus in central and southern 
Namibia. Northern Namibia was relatively unaffected by German rule. “Actual colonial intrusion 
here only occurred after the end of German rule and did not lead to the loss of land; outright, 
intense warfare involving continuous suffering and harassment for the resident people, 
concentrated in the North above all during the final stages of the liberation struggle in the late 
1970s and 1980s” (Kössler 2007: 368). For the majority of the population living north of the ‘Police 
Zone’, land redistribution is therefore not a significant issue (Melber 2005b: 138).51 It should be 
noted that this region also makes up most of the SWAPO voter base (Hamrick 2013: 82). 
Notwithstanding these regional differences, disputing land claims allowed the Namibian 
government to disentangle historic ties to land from redistributive policies, and regional-ethnic 
experiences with colonialism from land (Melber 2005b: 139; Melber 2005: 105; Hamrick 2013: 82). 
Not only did high-ranking politicians secure farmland for themselves after independence (Melber 
2005b: 137). This disentanglement also allowed the SWAPO-led government to make its voter base 
in northern Namibia (former Ovamboland) primary beneficiaries of land reform policies, despite 
“never [having been] dispossessed in the historical sense” (Werner 2002: 56, quoted from Melber 
2005b: 139). 
The land issue does not appear to have a significant influence on economic inequality in Namibia. 
Land in the former ‘Police Zone’ is not very productive52 and poverty reduction plans in the late 
1990s and early 2000s did not connect land reform to poverty reduction (Melber 2005b: 137). 
Discussing the government’s conspicuous lack of action regarding resettlement (2001 White Paper 
Resettlement Policy), Melber (2005b) notes the argument that the quality of the land would not 
necessarily have “promot[ed] a meaningful re-distributive effect by resettling people” (p. 138). 
Sherbourne (2004) argues that the land question in Namibia is more about race than about 
economic equality (ibid.: 139). Moreover, focussing on the economic aspects of land reform would 
disregard important socio-cultural and emotional dimensions involved. The expressed desire in 
the affected communities to regain ownership of the land that was taken from them “is a legitimate 
matter of dignity, self-respect and spirituality, not measurable in bare economic terms” (ibid.: 140).  
Hamrick (2013) gives some insights into land reform activism in Herero and Nama communities, 
which she observed during her field research in 2012. Land reform activists often use “the language of 
the law[,] including concepts of property rights, national reconciliation and constitutionality”, and 
pursue land reform through formal legal channels (p. 83). In contrast to the early 2000s when there 
was some competition for victimhood status, also regarding land expropriation under colonial rule,53 
this appears not to have been a point of contention in the past decade or longer. On the contrary, 
there are meanwhile efforts in the said Herero and Nama communities to connect with other groups 
on these issues, e.g. affected communities in diaspora, Jewish persons or communities that receive 
                                                 
50  Land gain was one motivating factor for German colonialisation of Namibia. Germany’s population was growing rapidly, 
and it faced social and economic problems associated with industrial capitalism (Hamrick 2013: 80). 
51  “Colonial-capitalist patterns of exploitation were established there in different ways: the colonial administration relied on 
forms of an indirect rule. It rather sought to exploit the people by means of introducing a strictly regulated and systematic 
system of organised contract labour in collaboration with local headmen” (Melber 2005b: 138). 
52  The most productive land is north of the previous ‘Police Zone’ (Melber 2005b: 140). 
53  Riruako declared the land issue as solely a Herero issue at the 2002 Herero Day. This statement waved away the 
dispossession of Nama groups, and “makes a mockery of the suffering of the Damara and San” (Melber 2005c: 141). 
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reparations from Germany, or civil society organisations and politicians in Germany (ibid.). Not only 
do activists criticise and use Namibian law (and the constitution) to strengthen their land claims, 
activists also “[a]rticulate their land claims increasingly in terms of the global legal language of 
reparations and restorative justice, arguing what has been stolen from them in tandem with the 
attempted elimination of their communities should be returned” (ibid.: 85).  
At the same time, some political figures also – or still – use threatening language, urging the 
government to take their calls for land reform seriously. For example, at the 2012 commemoration 
of the Battle of Ohamakari at the Okakarara Cultural Center, Constituency Councillor Kandorozu 
spoke of the genocide and land issues like this: “We lost out land [in the genocide] […] and the 
government has shown no interest in the past years to assist us in getting it back. One day we will 
organise ourselves as Hereros and grab farmlands around here by force so that the government can 
start listening to us” (Hamrick 2013: 78-79).54 As a matter of fact, the 2001 White Paper 
Resettlement Policy was not fulfilled: the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation has 
been extremely slow in buying commercial farmland for resettlement. Strikingly, for many years it 
did not spend its annual budget, although it was getting offers from farmers willing to sell their 
land (Melber 2005b: 138)! 
Kössler (2015) also discusses some positions from within the German-speaking community in 
Namibia, tied to denial of the genocide.55 He uses the example of Schneider-Waterberg, a German-
speaking Namibian with an internet platform,56 who “accuses ‘the progressive writers of new 
history’ (Neuhistoriker) of calling ‘land seizure (Landnahme) … now theft; pioneers were renamed 
as “settlers” which now was considered as disparaging; and development now as exploitation’” 
(Kössler 2015: 134). Through his use of the term Landnahme “Schneider-Waterberg implicitly lays 
claim to the whole assortment of colonialist mythology about supposedly empty lands that 
belonged to nobody (terra nullius) and at the same time, he claims the right of conquest” (ibid.: 
135). Of course, this is only one position within the German speaking community. Nevertheless, 
the denial of German colonial crimes is not uncommon in this community, and a wide audience 
follows Schneider-Waterberg’s platform. 
It will be interesting to observe the further developments in public discourse on land reform, 
which has just started creating spaces of interaction and prompted actors to position themselves in 
recent years.57 One example is the “Namibia – A Week of Justice” conference in May 2019. The 
conference, organised by the political foundation of the German Left Party (die Linke), i.e. the Rosa 
Luxemburg Stiftung, sought to bring together scholars, activists, legal practitioners, politicians, and 
civil society to discuss current topics around the genocide and its aftermath. Land reform became 
one of the key controversial topics in the conference, which saw the attendance of German 
speaking Namibians, government officials from both the German and Namibian governments, as 
well as members of the affected communities (Taylor 2019). 
  
                                                 
54  Kazenambo Kazenambo: “We will put the constitution aside. A constitution is a paper. If other people do not respect it, we 
will not respect it too. The white people must get this information” (Hamrick 2013: 90-1). 
55  Denialists of the genocide often ignore the expropriation of African land. 
56  He is a German-speaking amateur historian who denies the historical events to have been a genocide. He owns a large farm 
in the Waterberg – the site of the 1904 battle that drove the Herero to the desert – and draws large all-white audiences 
(Zuern 2012: 507). 
57  The second National Land Conference took place in October 2018. Prior to the conference, the importance of addressing 
ancestral land claims at the conference was widely discussed and reported in multiple newspapers (see media coverage 
Tjihenuna 2014, The Patriot 2018b, Shapwanale 2018). 
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6. CONCLUSION  
This paper has shown the contested nature of historical narratives in Namibia and the 
controversies which can arise when such narratives are reproduced and enshrined in (national) 
monuments, museums, or commemorations.  
The first part of this paper analysed the importance of the national liberator narrative for SWAPO 
as the ruling party since independence. This narrative legitimises SWAPO’s position in national 
and (to an extent) international politics and, together with its ‘National Reconciliation Policy’, 
protects it from consequences regarding human rights abuses committed during the armed 
liberation struggle. SWAPO’s interest in maintaining its position as sole liberator of the Namibian 
people conflicts with the experiences of the Herero and Nama populations in central and southern 
Namibia, who resisted German colonialism and consequently suffered genocide in the early 20th 
century. German colonialism disproportionately affected these regions, and the genocide of 1904-
1908 forms a central part of the historical narrative and collective identities for the Herero and 
Nama populations today. 
Herero and Nama activists use various platforms and means to achieve national and international 
attention for their claims to get recognition and reparations from the German government. Two 
main factions within Herero communities were outlined, with schisms along the recognition of the 
Ovaherero Paramount Chief and political affiliation to SWAPO. Information on Nama activist 
groups is less readily available; perhaps there is less mobilisation, or there are fewer clear divisions 
here. Even less information is available on Damara and San interest groups from the distance. Their 
positions may only be accessible on site. Lastly, the German speaking community was examined. 
Here, relativising narratives or denial of German colonial crimes appear to be widespread. 
These different actor groups and positions, though fluid in principle, were examined more closely 
on the bases of various cases. For this, we examined select places of memory, as was the communal 
commemoration of Herero Day in Okahandja, the repatriation of human remains from Germany 
in 2011, and the public debate on the restitution of ancestral lands. Taking one of these examples, 
the removal of the Rider Statue in Windhoek (2013) allowed a more detailed study of the memory 
politics practiced by the different groups: not only did members of the German-speaking 
community object to the statue’s removal, seeing the Rider as part of their colonial heritage and 
identity, members of Herero and Nama communities also objected, seeing the Rider as the only 
monument at the time that made direct reference to the genocide and, moreover, marked the spot 
of the Orumbo rua Katjombondi concentration camp. “Inherent in the distinctiveness of places is 
their meaning to individuals,” as Björkdahl and Buckley Zistel (2016) point out. This means in fact 
that spaces cannot be understood as being just there, as sites of certain events. Rather they 
represent different histories for different (groups of) people (see Björkdahl and Kappler 2017): 
“Spatial structures impact on representations of peace and conflict, while repoliticising agency on 
an everyday life basis” (p. 15).  
The Independence Memorial Museum and two new monuments replaced the Rider Statue in 2014. 
Although the museum’s focus is on the SWAPO-led armed liberation struggle and there were 
criticisms from some Herero and Nama activists for their lack of involvement in the planning stages, 
the museum addresses the crimes committed against the Herero and Nama in a ‘Chamber of 
Horrors’. Further research will be necessary to understand the history (strands) the museum tells, 
and to study its or else their reception. The creation and representation of national historical 
narratives always entail conflictual processes, involving contestation on whose histories and 
contributions should be remembered in what way. As the Namibian situation shows, these processes 
are tied into current and changing political interests, national and international. Decision makers on 
either side should be aware of the necessity to not only give way to controversies in memory culture 
but to actively foster a public debate which allows for hitherto marginalized actors to become heard 
also and thereby turn places into spaces for productive contestation. 
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